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This paper probes Paul Tillich’s conceptions of 
freedom and nationalism and their significance for 
current expressions in globalized contexts. There are 
three central sections of the paper: (1) an analysis of 
various features of globalization through the works 
of Arjun Appadurai, Saskia Sassen, Amy Chua, and 
Amartya Sen; (2) an examination of Tillich’s writ-
ings on freedom and nationalism in his 1933 The 
Socialist Decision and his later works; and (3) an 
investigation of a case study, the recent legislation 
banning conspicuous religious symbols in French 
public schools, and possible Tillichian rejoinders. 
My thesis holds that Tillich’s reflections remain in-
structive for the present globalized contexts because 
they protect an irreducible selfhood and freedom 
(tantamount to a transcendent imperative over con-
crete circumstances), yet they also affirm this self-
hood and freedom as shaped by others (manifested 
as participation within relationships and communi-
ties). Tillich encapsulates these claims in a participa-
tion-transcendence dynamic that bears the serious-
ness of a moral imperative without relinquishing 
attention to the concrete situation. 
Section One: Themes in Globalization 
The understandings of globalization vary mark-
edly,1 but a frequently identified feature is the inter-
penetration between the global and the local. Soci-
ologist Roland Robertson, for example, has stated 
that “globalization—in the broadest sense, the com-
pression of the world—has involved and increas-
ingly involves the creation and the incorporation of 
locality, processes which themselves largely shape, 
in turn, the compression of the world as a whole.”2 
This compression of local and global expresses the 
fluidity of freedom and selfhood within a post-
national world; more dramatically, this fluidity be-
comes manifested as conflict. As Saskia Sassen puts 
it, “[g]lobalization is a process that generates contra-
dictory spaces, characterized by contestation, inter-
nal differentiation, continuous border crossings.”3 
The balkanization of these contradictory spaces ap-
pears prominently in the global city, and Sassen ana-
lyzes the concrete implications of spaces of power-
lessness. The juxtaposition of power and powerless-
ness can erode social justice when manual laborers, 
principally women and immigrants, “are never rep-
resented as part of the global economy, [even if] 
they are in fact part of the infrastructure of jobs in-
volved in running and implementing the global eco-
nomic system.”4 Though they serve an irreplaceable 
function in the global economy, service workers in 
the global city are rendered invisible by economic 
structures that instrumentalize labor and destabilize 
and vitiate individual identities and freedoms.   
In addressing such phenomena, anthropologist 
Arjun Appadurai describes our decolonized worlds 
in terms of social imagination and constellations of 
global flows. Global flows express the disjunctures 
and de-territorialization that increasingly compel 
individuals to re-imagine their own identities and 
freedoms. Appadurai insists that the Weberian 
presuppositions about ethnicity as grounded 
principally in biological and genealogical kinship 
must be abandoned in favor of a view of ethnicity 
that “takes the conscious and imaginative 
construction and mobilization of difference as its 
core.”5 Whether manifested as ethnoscapes, 
mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, or 
ideoscapes, disjunctive, but ubiquitous global flows 
impact these imaginative constructions by blurring 
and exploding traditional boundaries and 
preconceptions. Appadurai denominates 
transnational cultural movements—funded by 
international migration—as “diasporic public 
spheres.”6 Within these diasporic spheres lies “the 
nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the 
bottle of the territorial state, [which] is now itself 
diasporic.”7 Weberian conceptions of nationalism 
and ethnicity as aggregate natural facts are super-
seded by nationalism and ethnicity as freedom and 
identities produced by the collective imagination. 
The blunting of such imagination has reductive 
ramifications, for it obviates collective identity and 
individual self-formation (Bildung). Tillich had an-
ticipated such deleterious ramifications in contem-
plating die Judenfrage in 1953: “The individual hu-
man being who belongs to a nation or to a race is no 
longer regarded as an individual. One sees the indi-
vidual only through the image of the type…Such 
stereotyping…was disastrous for the relationship 
between the Germans and the Jews.”8  If coll ctive imagi ation underlies nationalism, 
we must probe the relationship between freedom and 
nationalism, particularly freedom as construed in 
utilitarian terms of rational choice theory and wealth 
maximization by neo-classical economics. Here the 
biases of Western sensibilities confront a global 
world of marginalized, displaced, and heterogeneous 
persons. Amy Chua disabuses views that promote 
free-market democracy as the definitive strategy for 
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creating a secure and productive society in a global-
ized context: “Because markets and democracy 
benefit different ethnic groups in societies [with 
market-dominant minorities], the pursuit of free 
market democracy produces highly unstable and 
combustible conditions.”9 Chua points, for example, 
to Filipino Chinese who, though just 1 to 2 percent 
of the population, hold controlling interest in the 
principal commercial banks, department store 
chains, and major supermarkets of the Philippines.10 
She examines similar phenomena in the case studies 
of Brazil, Cameroon, and Russia as well as, on a 
broader context, anti-American sentiment. Chua 
does not espouse anti-democratic principles, but she 
cautions that democracy as presently conceived and 
implemented—that is, driven by a proposed synthe-
sis between market-driven economics and democ-
ratically-achieved consensus—cannot sustain free-
dom and flourishing because majorities do not ade-
quately participate in these processes. This disen-
franchisement of majorities has induced ethnic ha-
tred and violence, but it has also attenuated the links 
between material, market goods and national iden-
tity: “A principal focus of nationalist and ethnona-
tionalist anti-market reactions in the non-Western 
world has been the humiliating domination by ‘out-
siders’ of a nation’s economic symbols: oil wells in 
Latin America, gold mines in South Africa, forests 
in Burma and Indonesia, Lomonosov porcelain in 
Russia, or other sectors that have come symbolically 
to be associated with national identity.”11 Chua rec-
ommends that democracies and markets that expand 
participation, particularly ways that expand owner-
ship among the poor,12 can reconnect nationalism 
and freedom in ways that promote justice. We will 
see below the extent to which Tillich promotes de-
mocracy as a critical corrective to purely nationalis-
tic impulses, but a corrective that itself be restrained 
by the imperatives of justice. 
Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen also 
argues that our globalized context necessitates the 
rethinking the nature of freedom. Rather than con-
strue freedom in neoclassical or utilitarian terms as 
achievement, Sen holds that conceptions of freedom 
should attend to “the processes that allow freedom 
of actions and decisions, and the actual opportunities 
that people have, given their personal and social cir-
cumstances.”13 Similar to Chua,14 Sen envisages 
freedom as a capacious set of social and political 
individual opportunities broadly conceived as capa-
bilities. Sen’s capabilities approach acutely recog-
nizes the significance of moral values and nonmoral 
goods, and, consequently, the importance of trans-
forming social perceptions about market and non-
market freedoms. Sen posits that a sense of justice—
a sense discarded by the separation of fact and value 
by neo-classical and utilitarian models of econom-
ics—can be a decisively motivating factor for eco-
nomic action: “Social values can play—and have 
played—an important part in the success of various 
forms of social organization, including the market 
mechanism, democratic politics, elementary civil 
and political rights, provision of basic public goods, 
and institutions for public action and protest.”15 Sen 
points to the Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh, 
which not only afford women more substantial fi-
nancial opportunities but also enable them to partici-
pate more fully in social and economic affairs, 
thereby effectuating social change and redressing 
imbalanced power dynamics.16 
Section Two: Tillich’s Participation-
Transcendence Dynamic 
In his 1933 text, The Socialist Decision, sup-
pressed by the newly entrenched Nazis, Tillich 
fleshes out the disparate roots of nationalism. Greg-
ory Baum remarks that, “Tillich was one of the few 
anti-fascist writers of the thirties on who did not op-
pose nationalism on principle.”17 Tillich’s perspec-
tive, as Jean Richard notes, must be qualified and 
nuanced. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich develops 
a trenchant critique of the bourgeois and romantic 
elements of nationalism, but he also censures present 
forms of socialism. Tillich develops a social theory 
that distinguishes two types of consciousness, con-
sciousness of origin and consciousness of demand. 
In my reading, the former pertains to participation, 
or freedom shaped in and through relationships and 
communities, and the latter pertains to transcen-
dence, or a transcendent imperative over external 
circumstances. This dynamic helps illuminate our 
earlier discussion of freedom as participation in a 
global context, but it also contributes the unique di-
mension of transcendence. 
The Socialist Decision touches upon one aspect 
of the participation-transcendence dynamic, namely, 
the historical and universal character of the socialist 
principle. The socialist principle instantiates this dy-
namic because it “is a particular principle”18 yet “is 
rooted in the primordial human element.”19 Put dif-
ferently, bearing the influence of Heidegger, Tillich 
submits that “[t]he universal and the particular ele-
ment—human being [Sein] and the proletarian exis-
tence [Dasein]—therefore do stand alongside each 
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other in an unrelated way.”20 This relationship cre-
ates tension, but, unlike political romanticism that is 
fettered by contradiction or “the subjective, acciden-
tal, arbitrary elements in that which contradicts it-
self,”21 the socialist principle experiences conflict—
and here Tillich appropriates Schelling’s abyss and 
Kant’s antinomy that locate conflict in freedom it-
self—conflict that “is not rooted in the knowing sub-
ject, in the accidental and arbitrary, but in the thing 
itself.”22 The conflict of socialism lies in the fact that 
it seeks to “break through national limitations”23 but 
in a way that “is dependent for its own realization on 
national powers of origin.”24 Socialism converts it-
self when it does not fully repudiate the conscious-
ness of origin, maintains its “rational form”25 and 
therefore avoids the tendency to relapse into “utopi-
anism,”26 but challenges critically in and through its 
prophetic character. Socialism’s prophetic character, 
instantiated in the Hebrew prophets’ impassioned 
pleas for righteousness and justice or Marx’s resis-
tance to objectification, preserves freedom because it 
marshals “the counter-movement against this proc-
ess of dehumanization, against the tendency of capi-
talism to turn people into psychological mechanisms 
calculable pleasure-pain reactions.”27 
The prophetic character of socialism becomes 
critical in its demand for justice that expands partici-
pation.28 The powers of origin are interrogated, re-
strained, and transformed by the critical corrective of 
democracy, which itself is radicalized and restrained. 
As Tillich writes, “[t]he construction of the socialist 
state must be carried out within the tension between 
the powers of origin that support the structure of 
society and the democratic corrective that subjects it 
to the demand of justice.”29 In unifying power and 
justice, particular and universal converge in a neces-
sarily perduring tension that one transcends, but 
from which one does not fully separate.30 Jean Rich-
ard, who, like Gregory Baum, applies the insights of 
The Social Decision to contemporary discussions of 
the Province of Quebec and Canadian nationalism, 
envisages an analogy between the nation and the 
family. Jesus’ prophetic critique reconfigures the 
family into a more inclusive model of neighbor love, 
where the family “is broken but it is not abolished 
nor eliminated. It is broken in so far as it is opened 
to a wider, more universal dimension.”31 To be sure, 
upon coming to the United States, Tillich evacuates 
his earlier language of central planning and the uto-
pian ideals of socialism; nevertheless, he retains so-
cialism’s vision of the prophetically critical univer-
sal dimension. The smaller community of the nation 
remains present, but it is transmuted into a more in-
clusive notion of the reunion of the whole.  
In later writings, Tillich continues to expatiate 
on the dynamic of participation and transcendence 
with respect to freedom and nationalism. In under-
taking an extended historical excursus of courage 
vis-à-vis participation and individualization, Tillich 
in the Courage To Be juxtaposes, on the one hand, 
the mythologization of participation, including the 
“relapse to tribal collectivism [that] was readily visi-
ble in Nazism,”32 and, on the other hand, the denial 
of participation, including the “romantic irony [that] 
elevated the individual beyond all content and made 
him empty: he was no longer obliged to participate 
in anything seriously.”33 Tillich later identifies the 
individuation-participation dynamic as one of the 
ontological polarities in his Systematic Theology. 
Transcendence also remains central to his analysis of 
nationalism because nationalism can assume the 
form of ultimacy.34 This ultimacy frequently be-
comes demonic when nationalism “claims infinity 
without having it.”35 Tillich conflates nationalism 
and the demonic when writing in 1938 during the 
zenith of Nazi power: “At the present time national-
ism is the most evident and the most dangerous in-
carnation of the demonic principle in general, espe-
cially where, as in various places, it has assumed an 
explicitly religious form.”36 Nationalism signifies the 
collective consciousness of origin, but the critical 
consciousness of the prophetic voices necessitates 
transformation and transcendence. Tillich preserves 
the tension of the participation-transcendence dy-
namic when he defends the irreducible value of 
German nationalism in the postwar context. Writing 
in 1944, he upholds the prerogatives of German sov-
ereignty and integrity: “But if Germany is divided 
into three sovereign nations…then the greatest irre-
denta in world history will be created.”37 These two 
passages, one condemning the demonic character of 
nationalism and the other affirming the self-
determination of Germany, illustrate the complexity 





Section Three: Headscarves, Secularity, and  
Religious Freedom 
In 1905, France ratified the Law of Separation, 
where Article One of the Constitution affirmed 
France as a republic, indivisible, secular, democratic, 
and social, and resolved the issue of church and 
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state. The pursuit of secularity, laïcité, enabled 
France to disentangle itself from perceived Catholic 
coercion. Nearly one hundred years later, the gov-
ernment imposed a ban on conspicuous religious 
symbols in public schools, or neutral spaces, which 
was, according to a Chirac spokesperson, “a decision 
that respects our history, our customs, and our val-
ues...To do nothing would be irresponsible. It would 
be wrong.”38 Critics point to the ambiguity of the 
term “conspicuous” as politically motivated, given 
that it allows smaller Christian crosses but disallows 
the larger Islamic headscarves and Sikh turbans. The 
five million Muslims in France, roughly eight per-
cent of the population and expanding, have demon-
strated, but largely complied with the ban since its 
enactment into law this past September. 
The meaning of the veil, particularly its re-
emergence in the last few decades, has generated 
polemical debates: is it repressive to Muslim 
women, a tool of patriarchy, or is it a symbolic vehi-
cle for Muslim women to reclaim their Islamic iden-
tity and retain respectability in an increasingly secu-
larized world? The confounding problem of other-
ness, eloquently articulated by Edward Said and oth-
ers, continues to exacerbate understandings between 
Western and Arab views of freedom. Frequent mis-
understandings regarding hijab (religious modesty) 
through veiling such as reductionism problematize 
these debates and obfuscate the tremendous diversity 
of cultures of the Arab Middle East, including dif-
ferent forms of veils. I cannot adequately address 
such debates here, but our earlier discussion of con-
tradictory spaces again becomes relevant. Through 
interviews with Muslim women of varying ages, 
nationalities, and life-situations, Helen Watson ar-
gues that such narratives illustrate the ways “[e]ach 
woman is ‘caught between worlds’ in the sense of 
facing conflicting pressures and managing compet-
ing cultural values, tradition and persons aspira-
tions.”39 The interstitial space between worlds, what 
Tillich identified as the boundary, reflects the inter-
section of traditional values and globalized contexts.   
Given his interest in participation and transcen-
dence as well as remarks about the perils and neces-
sity of nationalism, how might Tillich respond to the 
banning of religious symbols in public schools? Til-
lich’s writings on religion and nationalism attract the 
attention of many thinkers, including the United 
States Supreme Court which consulted Tillich’s 
writings to adjudicate the claims of conscientious 
objectors in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965).40 Tillich would be attentive to the implica-
tions of the ban as part of his theology of culture: “A 
theology which does not deal seriously with the 
criticism of religion by secular thought and some 
particular forms of secular faith, such as liberal hu-
manism, nationalism, and socialism, would be ‘a-
kairos’—missing the demand of the historical mo-
ment.”41 Does the kairos compel us to consider the 
ban as disclosive of the meaning of participation in a 
polycentric and deliberatively secular society? Til-
lich’s concerns regarding the ban would pertain to 
the blunting of depth-content and self-formation and 
the envisioned separations between culture, moral-
ity, and religion. Self-transcendence occurs in and 
through participation, but, in light of our earlier 
analysis of globalization and Tillich’s own reflec-
tions, this participation cannot be limited to the na-
tion: “There is no self-transcendence under the di-
mension of the spirit without the constitution of the 
moral self by the unconditional imperative, and this 
self-transcendence cannot take form except within 
the universe of meaning created in the cultural 
act.”42 The ban not only fractures culture and relig-
ion, but it also seeks to eliminate the interpenetration 
of participation and transcendence. 
Tillich calls the denial of the symbols that ex-
press ultimate concern—symbols that reconfigure 
freedom and self-formation as transcendent but me-
diated by participation—a sacramental social atti-
tude. In his 1923 “Basic Principles of Religious So-
cialism,” he writes: “The personality is completely 
dominated by sacramental relations to the soil, pos-
sessions, the family, the tribe, the class, the nation, 
and the politico-cultic hierarchy.”43 The demand for 
justice, heard in the prophetic critique of justice and 
expressed as the moral imperative, enjoins neutral-
ity, but this neutrality cannot, according to Tillich, 
remove risk, courage, or doubt. In Dynamics of 
Faith, Tillich discusses two cases, one where society 
and the community of faith are nearly identical and 
one where they are distinct. In the rare case of the 
former, Tillich explains that if “[civil authorities] try 
to enforce spiritual conformity and are successful 
they have removed the risk and courage which be-
long to the act of faith.”44 In the case of latter, which 
resembles the situation in France, Tillich points to a 
common denominator that holds different religious 
groups together in a democratic society; he cautions 
that this denominator may be constitutionally upheld 
but that it cannot usurp ultimate concern:  
This denominator may be more secular or more 
religious. In any case it is an outgrowth of faith, 
and its expression—as in the American Consti-
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tution—is affirmed in an attitude which some-
times has the unconditional character of an ulti-
mate concern, but more often the conditional 
character of a preliminary concern of the highest 
degree. Just for this reason the civil authorities 
should not try to prohibit the expression of doubt 
about such a basic law, although they must en-
force the legal consequences of it.45 
The ban on religious symbols prohibits expres-
sions of doubt and courage and, with them, the pos-
sibility of self-criticism. Tillich’s development of the 
participation-transcendence dynamic upholds free-
dom as uniquely experienced but determined in and 
through relationality, community, and the experience 
of ultimate concern. Freedom becomes actualized as 
an imperative that, though transcendent, calls us to 
be who we are as we self-critically transform our-
selves in our globalized contexts.46 
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